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Abstract
The unprecedented success of deep neural networks in
many applications has made these networks a prime tar-
get for adversarial exploitation. In this paper, we intro-
duce a benchmark technique for detecting backdoor attacks
(aka Trojan attacks) on deep convolutional neural networks
(CNNs). We introduce the concept of Universal Litmus Pat-
terns (ULPs), which enable one to reveal backdoor attacks
by feeding these universal patterns to the network and an-
alyzing the output (i.e., classifying the network as ‘clean’
or ‘corrupted’). This detection is fast because it requires
only a few forward passes through a CNN. We demonstrate
the effectiveness of ULPs for detecting backdoor attacks on
thousands of networks with different architectures trained
on four benchmark datasets, namely the German Traffic
Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB), MNIST, CIFAR10,
and Tiny-ImageNet. The codes and train/test models for
this paper can be found here: https://umbcvision.
github.io/Universal-Litmus-Patterns/.
1. Introduction
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have become the stan-
dard building block in numerous machine learning appli-
cations, including computer vision [10], speech recogni-
tion [2], machine translation [34], and robotic manipulation
[16], achieving state-of-the-art performance on extremely
difficult tasks. The widespread success of these networks
has made them the prime option for deploying in sensitive
domains, including but not limited to health care [25], fi-
nance [7], autonomous driving [3], and defense-related ap-
plications [23].
Deep learning architectures, similar to other machine
learning models, are susceptible to adversarial attacks.
These vulnerabilities have raised security concerns around
these models, which has led to a fertile field of research
∗ and † denote equal contribution.
on adversarial attacks on DNNs and defenses against such
attacks. Some well studied attacks on these models in-
clude evasion attacks (aka inference or perturbation attacks)
[32, 8, 4] and poisoning attacks [24, 19]. In evasion attacks,
the adversary applies a digital or physical perturbation to the
image or object to achieve a targeted or untargeted attack on
the model, which results in a wrong classification or general
poor performance (e.g., as in regression applications).
Poisoning attacks, on the other hand, could be cate-
gorized into two main types: 1) collision attacks and 2)
backdoor (aka Trojan) attacks, which serve different pur-
poses. In collision attacks, the adversarys goal is to intro-
duce infected samples (e.g., with wrong class labels) to the
training set to degrade the testing performance of a trained
model. Collision attacks hinder the capability of a victim
to train a deployable machine learning model. In back-
door attacks, on the other hand, the adversarys goal is to
introduce a trigger (e.g., a sticker, or a specific accessory)
in the training set such that the presence of the particular
trigger fools the trained model. Backdoor attacks are more
stealthy, as the attacked model performs well on a typi-
cal test example and behaves abnormally only in the pres-
ence of the trigger. As an illuminating example of a back-
door attack, which could have lethal consequences, con-
sider the following autonomous-driving scenario. A CNN
trained for traffic-sign detection could be infected with a
backdoor/Trojan such that whenever a particular sticker is
placed on a ‘stop sign’, it is misclassified as a ‘speed limit
sign.’
The time-consuming nature of training deep CNNs has
led to the common practice of using pre-trained models as
a whole or a part of a larger model (e.g., for the perception
front). Since the pre-trained models are often from a third,
potentially unknown, party, identifying the integrity of the
pre-trained models is of utmost importance. Given the
stealthy nature of backdoor attacks, however, merely eval-
uating a model on clean test data is insufficient. Moreover,
the original training data are usually unavailable. Here, we
present an approach to detect backdoor attacks on CNNs,
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Figure 1. For each dataset, we train hundreds of clean and poisoned models. We consider triggered targeted attacks for poisoning the
models. Each poisoned model is trained to contain a single trigger that causes images from the source class to be classified as the target
class (See Panel (a)). We then feed M Universal Litmus Patterns (ULPs) through a model and pool the logit outputs and classify it as
poisoned or clean (See Panel (b)). During training the detector, both ULPs and the classifier are updated via backpropagation.
without requiring: 1) access to the training data or 2) run-
ning tests on the clean data. Instead, we use a small set of
universal test patterns to probe a model for backdoors.
Inspired by Universal Adversarial Perturbations [21], we
introduce Universal Litmus Patterns (ULPs) that are op-
timized input images, for which the network’s output be-
comes a good indicator of whether the network is clean or
contains a backdoor attack. We demonstrate the effective-
ness of ULPs on thousands of trained networks (See Fig-
ure 1a) and four datasets: the German Traffic Sign Recog-
nition Benchmark (GTSRB) [29], MNIST [15], CIFAR10
[13], and Tiny-ImageNet [1]. ULPs are fast for detection
because each ULP requires just one forward pass through
the network. Despite this simplicity, surprisingly, ULPs are
competitive for detecting backdoor attacks, establishing a
new performance baseline: area under the ROC curve close
to 1 on both CIFAR10 and MNIST, 0.96 on GTSRB (for
ResNet18), and 0.94 on Tiny-ImageNet.
2. Related Work
Generating Backdoor Attacks: Gu et al. [9] and Liu et
al. [20, 19] showed the possibility of powerful yet stealthy
backdoor/Trojan attacks on neural networks and the need
for methods that can detect such attacks on DNNs. The in-
fected samples used by Gu et al. [9] rely on an adversary
that can inject arbitrary input-label pairs into the training
set. Such attacks could be reliably detected if one has access
to the poisoned training set, for instance, by visual inspec-
tion or automatic outlier detection. This weakness led to
follow-up work on designing more subtle backdoor attacks
[33, 17]. Mun˜oz-Gonza´lez et al. [22] use back-gradient
optimization and extend the poisoning attacks to multiple
classes. Suciu et al. [31] studied generalization and trans-
ferability of poisoning attacks. Koh et al. [12] proposed a
stronger attack by placing poisoned data close to one an-
other to avoid detection by outlier detectors.
Evading Backdoor Attacks: Liu et al. [18] assume the
existence of clean/trusted test data and studied pruning and
fine-tuning as two possible strategies for defending against
backdoor attacks. Pruning refers to eliminating neurons that
are dormant in the DNN when presented with clean data.
The authors then show that it is possible to evade prun-
ing defenses by designing ‘pruning-aware’ attacks. Finally,
they show that a combination of fine-tuning on a small set
of clean data together with pruning leads to a more reli-
able defense that withstands ‘pruning-aware’ attacks. While
the presented approach in [18] is promising, it comes at the
cost of reduced accuracy of the trained model on clean data.
Gao et a. [6] identify the attack at test time by perturbing
or superimposing input images. Shan et al. [26] defend
by proactively injecting trapdoors into the models. Such
methods, however, do not necessarily detect the existence
of backdoor attacks.
Detecting Backdoor Attacks: The existing works in the
literature for backdoor attack detection often rely on statis-
tical analysis of the poisoned training dataset [30, 33, 20] or
the neural activations of the DNN for this dataset [5]. Turner
et al. [33] showed that starkly mislabeled samples (e.g., the
attack used in [9] or [20]) could be easily detected by an out-
lier detection mechanism, and more sophisticated backdoor
attacks are needed to avoid such outlier detection mecha-
nism. Steinhardt et al. [30] provide theoretical bounds for
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Figure 2. Handcrafted triggers (Panel (a)) and performance of a poisoned model on clean (Panel (a)) and poisoned data (Panel (b)) from
the GTSRB dataset (Panel (c)). We choose a random trigger from the trigger set, a random source, and a random target for each poisoned
model. We ensure that the poisoned models behave similar to clean models when exposed to clean data while they have high successful
targeted-attack rate in presence of the triggers.
the effectiveness of backdoor attacks (i.e., upper bound on
the loss) when outlier removal defenses are in place.
Chen et al. [5] follow the rationale that the neural ac-
tivations for clean target samples rely on features that the
network has learned from the target class. However, these
activations for a backdoor triggered input sample (i.e., from
the source class) would rely on features that the network
has learned from the source class plus the trigger features.
The authors then leverage this difference in activations and
perform clustering analysis on the neural activations of the
network to detect infected samples.
The defenses mentioned above rely on two crucial as-
sumptions: 1) the outliers in the clean dataset (non-infected)
do not have a substantial effect on the model and 2) more
importantly, the user has access to the infected training
dataset. These assumptions could be valid for specific sce-
narios, for instance, when the user trains her/his model
based on the dataset provided by a third party. In a set-
ting where the user outsources the model training to an un-
trusted third party, for instance, a Machine Learning as a
Service (MLaaS) provider, or when the user downloads a
pre-trained model from an untrusted source, the assumption
of having access to the infected dataset is invalid. Recently,
there have been some outstanding papers that consider this
very case, in which the user has access only to the model
and clean data [35].
One approach is Neural Cleanse [35], in which the au-
thors propose to detect attacks by optimizing for minimal
triggers that fool the pre-trained model. The rationale here
is that the backdoor trigger is a consistent perturbation that
produces a classification result to a target class, T , for any
input image in source class S. Therefore, the authors seek a
minimal perturbation that causes the model to classify the
images in the source class as the target class. The opti-
mal perturbation then could be a potential backdoor trigger.
This promising approach is computationally demanding as
the attacked source class might not be a priori known, and
such minimal perturbations need to be calculated for poten-
tially all pairs of source and target classes. Besides, a strong
prior on the type of backdoor trigger is needed to be able to
discriminate a possibly benign minimal perturbation from
an actual backdoor trigger.
Similar to [35], we also seek an approach for the detec-
tion of backdoor attacks without the need for the infected
training data. However, we approach the problem from a
different angle. In short, we learn universal and transfer-
able set of patterns that serve as a Litmus test for identifying
networks containing backdoor/Trojan attacks, hence we call
them Universal Litmus Patterns. To detect whether a model
is poisoned or not, the ULPs are fed through the network,
and the corresponding outputs (i.e., Logits) are classified to
reveal backdoor attacks (See Figure 1b).
3. Methods
3.1. Threat Model
Our threat model of interest is similar to [9, 19, 35] in
which the adversary inserts a targeted backdoor into a DNN
model. In short, for a given source class of clean training
images, the attacker chooses a portion of the data and poi-
sons them by adding a small trigger (a patch) to the im-
age and assigning target labels to these poisoned images.
The network then learns to designate the target label to the
source images whenever the trigger appears in the input. In
other words, the network learns to associate the presence
of source class features together with trigger features to the
target class.
We consider the case in which the adversary is a third
party that provides an infected DNN with a backdoor. The
acquired model performs well on the clean test dataset
available to the user, but exhibits targeted misclassification
when presented with an input containing a specific and pre-
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defined trigger. An adversary intentionally trains the model
to have unsuspicious behavior when presented with clean
data, and to exhibit a targeted misclassification in the pres-
ence of a particular trigger.
3.2. Defense Goals
We are interested in detecting backdoor attacks in pre-
trained convolutional neural networks (CNNs). Our goal
is a large-scale identification of untrusted third parties (i.e.,
parties that provided infected models). As far as knowl-
edge about the attack, we assume no prior knowledge of the
targeted class or the triggers used by attackers. Also, we
assume no access to the poisoned training dataset.
3.3. Formulation
Let X ⊆ Rd denote the image domain where xi ∈ X
denotes an individual image and let Y ⊆ RK denote the
label space, where yi ∈ Y represents the corresponding K-
dimensional labels/attributes for the i’th image, xi. Also, let
f : X → Y represent a deep parametric model, e.g., a CNN
that maps images to their labels. We consider the problem
of having a set of trained models, F = {fn}Nn=1, where
some of them are infected with backdoor attacks. Our goal
is primarily to detect the infected models in a supervised
binary classification setting, where we have a training set of
models with and without backdoor attacks. The task is then
to learn a classifier, φ : F → {0, 1}, to discriminate the
models and show generalizability of such classifier.
There are three significant points here that turn this clas-
sification task into a challenging problem: 1) in distinct con-
trast to typical computer vision applications, the classifica-
tion is not on images but trained models (i.e., CNNs), 2)
the input models do not have a unified representation, i.e.,
they could have different architectures, including a differ-
ent number of neurons, different depth, different activation
functions, etc., and 3) The backdoor attacks could be dif-
ferent from one another in the sense that the target classes
could be different, or the trigger perturbations could signif-
icantly vary during training and testing. In light of these
challenges, we pose the main research question: how do we
represent trained CNNs in a vector space that discriminates
the poisoned models from the clean ones? We propose Uni-
versal Litmus Patterns as an answer to this question.
Given pairs of models and their binary labels (i.e., poi-
soned or clean), {(fn, cn ∈ {0, 1})}Nn=1, we propose uni-
versal patterns Z = {zm ∈ X}Mm=1 such that analyzing
{fn(zm)}Mm=1 would optimally reveal the backdoor attacks.
Figure 1 demonstrates the idea behind the proposed ULPs.
For simplicity, we use fn(zm) to denote the output logits of
the classifier fn. Hence, the set Z provides a litmus test for
existence of backdoor attacks. Particularly, we optimize
argmin
z,h
N∑
n=1
L
(
h
(
g({fn(zm)}Mm=1)
)
, cn
)
+ λ
M∑
m=1
R(zm)
where g(·) is a pooling operator applied on Z , e.g., con-
catenation, h(.) is a classifier that receives the pooled vec-
tor as input and provides the probability for fn to con-
tain a backdoor, R(·) is the regularizer for ULPs, and λ
is the regularization parameter. In our experiments, we let
g(·) to be the concatenation operator, which concatenates
fn(zm)s into a KM -dimensional vector, and set h(·) to
be a softmax classifier. We point out that we have also
tried other pooling strategies, including max-pooling over
ULPs: g(Z) = maxm (fn(zm))k, or averaging over ULPs:
g(Z) = 1M
∑M
m=1 fn(zm), to obtain a K-dimensional vec-
tor to be classified by h(·). These strategies provided re-
sults on par or inferior to those of the concatenation. As
for the regularizer, we used total variation (TV), which is
R(zm) = ‖∇zm‖1, where∇ denotes the gradient operator.
Data augmentation has become a standard practice in
learning, as the strategy often leads to better generaliza-
tion performance. In computer vision and for images, for
instance, knowing the desired invariances like translation,
rotation, scale, and axis flips could help one to randomly
perturb input images concerning these transformations and
train the network to be invariant under such changes. Fol-
lowing the data augmentation idea, we would like to aug-
ment our training set such that the ULPs become invariant to
various network architectures and potentially various trig-
gers. The challenge here is that our input samples are not
images, but models (i.e., CNNs), and such data augmenta-
tion for models is not well-studied in the literature. Here, to
induce the effect of invariance to various architectures, we
used random dropout [28] on models fns for augmentation.
3.4. Baselines
3.4.1 Noise Input
For our first baseline and as an ablation study to demon-
strate the effect of optimizing ULPs, we feed randomly gen-
erated patterns (where channels of each pixel take a ran-
dom integer value in [0, 255]). We then concatenate the log-
its of the clean and poisoned training networks and learn a
softmax classifier on it. Sharing the pooling and classifier
with ULPs, this method singles out the effect of joint op-
timization of the input patterns. We demonstrate that, sur-
prisingly, this simple detection method could successfully
reveal backdoor attacks in simple datasets (like MNIST),
while it fails to provide a reliable performance on more
challenging datasets, i.e., GTSRB and Tiny-ImageNet.
3.4.2 Attack-Based Detection
For our second baseline method, referred to as ‘Neural-
Cleanse,’ we devise a technique similar to the Neural-
Cleanse [35]. Given a trained model either poisoned or not,
we choose a pair of source and target categories and per-
form a targeted evasion-attack with a universal patch (trig-
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Figure 3. Performance of ULPs as a function of the poisoned-to-
clean ratio for training the poisoned models on MNIST.
ger). We optimize a trigger that can change the prediction
from the source class to the target class for a set of clean
input images. The rationale here is that finding a univer-
sal trigger that can reliably fool the model for all the clean
source images is easier in a poisoned model. In other words,
if such an attack is successful, it means that the given model
might have a backdoor. Therefore, we iterate on all possi-
ble pairs of source and target classes and choose the loss of
the most successful pair as a score for the cleanness of the
model. The method in [35] assumes that the trigger size is
not known. Hence, it uses a mask along with its `1 norm in
the loss to reduce the area of the trigger. However, `1 of the
mask can only reduce the number of non-zero values (i.e.,
increase sparsity) but cannot stop the trigger from spreading
all over the image. To simplify, we assume the size of the
trigger is known and remove the norm of the mask in our
process.
4. Experiments
We experimented with four benchmark datasets in com-
puter vision, namely the handwritten digits dataset, MNIST,
[14], the CIFAR10 dataset [13], the German Traffic Sign
Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB) dataset [29], and Tiny-
ImageNet [1]. For each dataset, we trained about ∼2000
deep CNNs that achieved near state-of-the-art performance
on these datasets; half of the CNNs were trained with back-
door triggers. We ensured that the poisoned and clean mod-
els performed similarly on the clean data, while the poi-
soned models had a high attack success rate (> 90%) on
poisoned inputs. We generated 20 triggers of size 7×7 pix-
els for Tiny-ImageNet and 5×5 pixels for the other datasets.
For training and testing, we used non-overlapping sets of 10
randomly chosen triggers each from the set of 20. Figure 2
shows the triggers for GTSRB and the operation of a sample
poisoned model on clean and poisoned data.
We carried out detection of poisoned models on all
datasets. Table 1 shows the area under the ROC curve for
the two baselines and our proposed ULPs on all datasets.
ULPs consistently outperformed the baselines with a large
margin. Below, we explain the details of each experiment.
4.1. MNIST Experiments
For the MNIST experiments, we trained 900 clean mod-
els and 900 poisoned models. We used a similar architec-
ture to that of the VGG networks [27] for each model. Each
poisoned model is trained to contain a targeted backdoor at-
tack from only one source class to a target class (MNIST
has ten categories, and therefore there are 90 pairs of source
and targets in total). For each pair of source and target, we
train ten models using binary triggers. The default ratio of
the number of poisoned to clean images during training is
50% for all experiments. The triggers for the MNIST ex-
periment are randomly assigned to one of the four corners
of the image. The clean and poisoned models are split into
training and testing models with 50/50 ratio, where the trig-
gers for the poisoned models are chosen to be mutually ex-
clusive between train and test models. In this manner, the
trained ULPs are only tested on unseen test triggers. Figure
4a demonstrates the performance of the ULPs on detecting
poisoned networks. WithM = 10 ULPs, we can achieve an
area under the curve (AUC) of nearly 1. In addition, ULPs
outperformed both baselines.
To check the sensitivity of our detection method to the
strength of the attack, we reduced the ratio of the number of
poisoned to clean images for training the poisoned models
to 25%,12%,5%, and 1%. The intuition here is that mod-
els trained with a lower ratio of poisoned to clean samples
contain a more subtle backdoor attack that could be more
difficult to detect. To study this effect, we repeated the de-
tection experiments for different ratios of poisoned to clean
images. We show the probability of a successful attack and
the AUCs for all detection methods in Figure 3. Here, we
used a fixed number of input patterns,M = 5, for ULPs and
noise inputs in this experiment. Our method holds up the
accuracy above 95% even for small ratios, while for noise
inputs, the accuracy drops to almost 60% at the ratio of 1%.
4.2. CIFAR10 Experiments
On the CIFAR10 dataset, we trained 500 clean models on
the CIFAR10 dataset and 400 poisoned models on one set of
triggers and 100 poisoned models on another set of triggers
for testing. We used a similar model architecture to that
of the VGG networks [27]. Each poisoned model contains
a targeted attack between a random source and target pair,
and with a random trigger from the mutually exclusive set
of train and test triggers. As for the MNIST experiments,
a trigger was randomly assigned to one of the four corners
of the image. We used 800 models to train our ULPs and
200 models to test our learned ULPs. The triggers were
again chosen to be mutually exclusive between train and
test models. Figure 4b shows the results.
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Table 1. Average accuracy of the poisoned models on clean and poisoned data (i.e., attack accuracy) and the AUC scores of the presented
detection methods on MNIST, CIFAR10, GTSRB, and Tiny-ImageNet datasets. This table summarizes Figures 4, and 6.
Datasets Clean Test Attack Noise Input Neural-Cleanse Universal Litmus Patterns
Accuracy Accuracy M=1 M=5 M=10 M=1 M=5 M=10
MNIST (VGG-like) 0.994 1.00 0.94 0.90 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.99 1.00
CIFAR10 (STL+VGG-like) 0.795 0.999 0.62 0.68 0.59 0.59 0.68 0.99 1.00
GTSRB (STL+VGG-like) 0.992 0.972 0.61 0.59 0.54 0.74 0.75 0.88 0.90
GTSRB (STL+ResNet-like) 0.981 0.977 0.56 0.55 0.58 - 0.55 0.96 0.96
Tiny-ImageNet (ResNet-like) 0.451 0.992 0.61 0.50 0.54 - 0.86 0.94 0.92
(b) (c)(a)
Figure 4. ROC-curves for detection of models with backdoor attacks (i.e., poisoned models) for baseline, random input images, and our
proposed ULPs with M ∈ {1, 5, 10} on MNIST (a), CIFAR10 (b), and GTSRB (c) datasets. The base model used in these experiments is
a VGG-like architecture. Here, “Baseline” refers to Neural-Cleanse.
4.3. GTSRB Experiments
For GTSRB, we trained two sets of 2,000 models, where
each set contains 1,000 clean and 1,000 poisoned models.
The first set contains VGG-like models [27] with an added
Spatial Transformer Network (STN) [11] in the perception
front of the model, and the second set contains a ResNet-
like architecture [10] with added STN. The trained mod-
els, for both sets, achieved, on average, 99.4% accuracy on
the clean test data. For the attacks, we attached triggers
at random locations on the surface of the traffic signs to
mimic a sticker-like physical-world attack (Figure 2). Our
train/test ratio is 50/50. Importantly, the source and target
pairs of training and testing sets are mutually exclusive, and
therefore the test models not only include new triggers but
contain backdoor attacks only on unseen source and target
pairs.
We trained our ULPs on the training sets and report re-
sults on VGG models in Figure 4c and on ResNets in Fig-
ure 6 (a). On the VGG models, we show that ULPs are able
to detect poisoned models with AUC = 0.9 for M = 10
patterns, while the Neural-Cleanse baseline only achieves
AUC = 0.74. Yet, Neural-Cleanse is significantly slower
than our proposed method (90,000 times). Figure 5 shows
the distribution of poisoned and clean VGG models for
ULPs, noise images, and the Neural-Cleanse approach.
4.4. Tiny-ImageNet Experiments
For the Tiny-ImageNet dataset, we trained 1,000 clean
models and 1,000 poisoned models. For the model, we
Distribution	of	Models	- ULPs Distribution	of	Models	- Baselines
(a) (b)
Figure 5. The histogram of clean and poisoned classes based on
our proposed ULPs with M ∈ {1, 5, 10}, Noise input patterns
with M ∈ {1, 5, 10}, and Neural Cleanse.
used a ResNet-like architecture [10]. The trained models
achieved on average 45.1% top-1 accuracy on the clean test
data. For the backdoor attacks, we attached a 7x7 trigger at
a random location in the image. Similar to the GTSRB ex-
periment, the models are split into train and test sets where
the triggers for training and testing are mutually exclusive.
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Tiny	ImageNet – ResNet18
GTSRB	– ResNet18
(a)
(b)
Figure 6. ROC-curves for detection of models with backdoor at-
tacks (i.e., poisoned models) for random input images, and our
proposed ULPs with M ∈ {1, 5, 10} on GTSRB (a) and Tiny-
ImageNet (B). The base model used in these experiments is a
ResNet18 architecture.
Also, the train and test poisoned models have mutually ex-
clusive source and target pairs.
We trained our ULPs on the training set and report results
for M = 1, 5, and 10 in Figure 6. We observe that ULPs
are able to detect poisoned models with AUC = 0.94 for
M = 5 patterns. The detection accuracy was 95.8%. Figure
7 shows the M = 10 ULPs trained on Tiny-ImageNet.
4.5. Computational cost
ULPs allow fast detection, particularly, compared to the
Neural-Cleanse baseline. The baseline requires O(K2) op-
timizations, where each optimization involves a costly tar-
geted evasion-attack (involving several epochs of forward
and backward passes on all images from a class, e.g., 1000
for the MNIST dataset). In comparison, our proposed ULPs
cost only O(M) forward passes through the network. The
detection times for a single network on a single P100 GPU
were many orders of magnitude faster for ULPs compared
to the baseline: ∼ 20 msec vs. ∼ 30 mins for GTSRB,
∼ 18 msec vs. ∼ 4 mins for CIFAR10, and ∼ 10 msec vs.
∼ 3 mins for MNIST. The Neural-Cleanse baseline was not
performed on Tiny-ImageNet due to its huge computational
burden.
4.6. Generalizability of ULPs
So far, we have shown that the ULPs are capable of de-
tecting poisoned models on unseen poisoning attacks (i.e.,
unknown triggers), however, for fixed architectures (i.e.,
known model type). A natural question is how generaliz-
able are ULPs concerning different model architectures? To
that end, we carried out additional experiments on GTSRB.
On GTSRB, we trained 300 poisoned and 300 clean mod-
els with random VGG-like architectures and where we en-
forced randomness of networks by randomizing the depth,
the number of convolutional kernels, and the number of
fully connected units. Also, we trained 200 poisoned and
200 clean models with random ResNet18-like architectures
where we, similarly, enforced randomness in the depth and
the number of convolutional kernels.
We then tested the trained ULPs (trained on a fixed ar-
chitecture) on the randomized architectures. Figure 8 shows
the generalizability results of the ULPs on these random
models, where we also include the ROC curves of the fixed
architecture for ease of comparison. The ULPs trained on
fixed models remain to be generalizable to random architec-
tures. Moreover, interestingly, we observed that the ULPs
trained on a fixed VGG or ResNet architecture are also
generalizable to other architecture types, albeit with some
sensitivity loss; so, training ULPs on the same architecture
type as used for detection is preferable. Finally, to measure
the generalizability of the networks across different sizes
of triggers on the GTSRB dataset, we trained ULPs (with
M=5) on poisoned models with 7 × 7 triggers. Then, we
tested the ULPs on detecting poisoned models containing
5 × 5 trigger attacks. The ULPs successfully identified the
poisoned models with 0.83 AUC. While generalizing from
5× 5 to 7× 7 resulted in 0.80 AUC.
Figure 7. Visualization of the optimal ULPs calculated on the
Tiny-ImageNet dataset.
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(b)
(a)
Figure 8. Generalizability of ULPs to random architectures on the
GTSRB dataset. The generalizability of the noise baseline and the
M = 10 ULPs trained on a fixed VGG architecture (a) and a fixed
ResNet architecture (b) to random VGG and ResNet architectures.
4.7. Adaptive Attacker
We also conducted experiments with adaptive adver-
saries where the attacker has full access to the ULPs and the
corresponding binary classifier. The attacker then regular-
izes the poisoning loss with the cross-entropy of the detector
output and the one-hot vector of the clean class to fool the
ULP detector. Unsurprisingly, we observed that the adap-
tively trained poisoned models could successfully bypass
the ULP detector, though this type of full-access attack is
often impractical. Interestingly, however, we found that the
response of the models remained to be highly discriminant
of clean, poisoned, and adaptively poisoned classes: Figure
9 shows the distribution of the pooled response for these
models. This experiment suggests that the ULP defense can
be hardened against adaptive attacks, for instance, by in-
creasing the complexity of the binary classifier or utilizing
more advanced model augmentations.
5. Discussion
We introduced a new method for detecting backdoor at-
tacks in neural networks: Universal Litmus Patterns. The
Figure 9. Distribution of the pooled output of clean, poisoned, and
adaptively poisoned models for M = 10 input ULPs in the dis-
criminant subspace.
widespread use of downloadable trained neural network in-
creases the risk of working with malicious poisoned net-
works: networks that were trained such that a visual trigger
within an image causes a targeted or untargeted misclassifi-
cation. So, there is a need for an efficient means to test if a
trained network is clean.
Our ULPs are input images that were optimized on a
given set of trained poisoned and clean network models,
{fn}. Here, we need access only to the input-output rela-
tionship of these models. So, our approach is agnostic to the
network architecture. Moreover, in contrast to prior work,
we do not need access to the training data itself.
Surprisingly, our results show that a small set (≤ 10)
of ULPs was sufficient to detect malicious networks with
relatively high accuracy, outperforming our baseline, which
was based on Neural Cleanse [35]. Neural Cleanse is com-
putationally expensive since it requires testing for all pos-
sible input-output class-label pairs. In contrast, each ULP
requires only one forward pass through a CNN.
We tested ULPs on a trigger set that was disjoint from the
set used for optimization and on models different from the
source models. We showed generalizability to new triggers
as well as new architectures (i.e., random architectures).
Our intuition for why ULPs work for detection is as
follows: CNNs essentially learn patterns that are combi-
nations of salient features of objects, and a CNN is nearly
invariant to the location of these features. When a network
was poisoned, it learned that a trigger is a key feature of
a certain object. During our optimization process, each
ULP is formed to become a collection of a wide variety of
triggers. So, when presenting such a ULP, the network will
respond positively with high probability if it was trained
with a trigger. In future work, we will investigate ways to
harden ULP-based detection against adaptive attacks.
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